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Defining the Relevant Market in
Health Care Antitrust Litigation:
Hospital Mergers*
INTRODUCTION
The health care system in the United States has undergone
numerous changes in the past decade,' with hospitals, in partic-
ular, leading the way.2 This $136 billion a year industry3 has
experienced changes in the manner of receiving payments4 that
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Harold Weinberg
for his guidance in preparing this Comment.
I See D. STARKWEATHER, HOSPITAL MERGERS IN THE MAKING (1981); Mullner,
Hospital Closures Remain Stable, Hosp., July 16, 1985, at 91. See also M. RAFFEL, THE
U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM (2d ed. 1984). The changes in the health care industry include
technological advancement of equipment, proliferation of outpatient facilities, more
stringent regulatory laws, and a more restrictive payment system. Id. at 187-256.
2 See generally J. GOLDSMITH, CAN HOSPITALS SuRvivE? (1981) [hereinafter J.
GOLDSMITH, HOSPITALS]. The hospital industry is the largest segment of the health care
delivery system. It is the institutional core and the most capital intensive component of
the health care system. Id. It is also labor intensive, and in 1980 employed 3.8 million
people nationwide. RAMEL, supra note 1, at 187-203; J. Goldsmith, Outlooks For
Hospitals: Systems Are the Solutions, 1 BIOETmics REP. 502, 508 (1985) [hereinafter J.
Goldsmith, Systems]. The hospital industry includes various institutions that provide
inpatient and outpatient care. These institutions are general and specialty hospitals and
range in size and function. Id.
I AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPITAL STATISTICS (1984 ed.). This figure
includes all general and federal acute care hospitals for the calendar year 1983.
' The Prospective Payment System (PPS) went into effect in October 1983. It
replaced the restrospective payment system that the Medicare program utilized since its
inception in 1965. The retrospective payment of health services allowed hospitals to bill
for any reasonable charges for services provided to the patient, no matter how extended
his stay. As long as the charge was allowable there was no incentive to be efficient. This
system allowed most hospitals to survive without actively pursuing patients and physi-
cians. Consequently, traditional characteristics of competition were absent. See Teitel-
man, Taking the Cure, FORBES, June 1984, at 82; Note, Hospital Antitrust: The Merging
Hospital and the Resulting Exposure to Antitrust Merger and Monopolization Laws, 24
WASHBURN L.J. 300, 301 n.90 (1984-85) (citing Teitelman, Taking the Cure, FORBES,
June 1984, at 82).
PPS affects short-term acute care hospitals and limits the amount of reimbursement
to those hospitals by pre-determining a fixed price for a particular diagnostic related
group (DRG). This payment system accounts for a substantial portion of hospital revenue
and has an overall effect of making hospitals more cost efficient because diagnosis,
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have caused decreased utilization of inpatient services. 5 As a
result, hospitals have altered the way they conduct business.6
They have become more competitive7 and now can be compared
to the many other profit-oriented businesses from which they
are borrowing effective managerial and marketing techniques.'
Through strategic planning, 9 hospitals are diversifying into re-
lated areas to establish a broader revenue base and a larger
rather than the amount of services provided, determines how much money the hospitals
will receive. See Federal Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, 42 C.F.R. § 405
(1985); J. ZIEGENFUSS, DRG's AND HospresL IMPACT 5 (1985).
See R. CATERTNICCHiO, DRG's (1984). After implementation of the Prospective
Payment System, hospitals have been forced to reduce utilization of inpatient services
but to increase their admissions to remain fimancially viable. The effect has caused a
decrease in the length of stay for most services and a shift toward providing more care
on an outpatient basis. Id. In 1984, the hospital industry experienced both decreasing
length and number of admissions as a result of the new reimbursement system. In turn,
the utilization of outpatient services increased substantially. See Freko, Admissions Fall
But Margins Are Up, Hose., May 1, 1985, at 70. See also ZLEGENMUss, supra note 4, at
104-31. "Hospitals still may change their emphasis to ambulatory-based services, and
may accelerate into clinic ... [moreover] [h]ospitals will seek to cut the average patient
length of stay and limit the number of tests and services provided." Id. at 104.
6 Hospitals have "tighten[ed] operating systems, develop[ed] more sophisticated
computer systems and increas[ed] marketing efforts" to attract quality physicians and
paying patients. See Gregory and Kaufman, Managing the Diversification Risk, HEALTH-
CARE FIN. Mcer., Dec. 1983, at 30.
' Hospitals have recognized the need to attract more paying patients. Marketing pro-
grams that include newspaper and television advertisements are commonplace. Alternative
methods of attracting patients such as satellite centers, Preferred Provider Organizations,
Health Maintenance Organizations, and insurance programs have proliferated. Many
hospitals build physican office buildings near their institutions to attract physicians who
might find it convenient to admit their patients to the adjacent facility. Also, many hospitals
are initiating ambulance programs via ground and air in order to increase their patient
volume. See generally J. GOLDSMITH, HosPITALs, supra note 2.
Traditionally, hospitals were not operated in a manner similar to retail stores
or other businesses that serve the general public. Today the emphasis is on public image
and profitability, an approach which is not readily distinguishable from other consumer-
oriented service industries. Id. See E. JOHNSON, HosPiTALs ni TRANsmox (1982). Hospitals
currently are seeking to apply successful management techniques from other industries.
These considerations demonstrate an emphasis on profitability and efficiency as opposed
to the purely humanitarian focus that is associated with medical care. Terms such as
"strategic planning" and "portfolio analysis" are now widely used in this multimillion dollar
industry, Id.; Stuart & Steele, Can a Hospital Mean Business?, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMrr.,
Dec. 1983, at 26-28.
9 Strategic planning entails the linking of hospital financial, operational, planning,
and marketing activities. This focuses the hospital's activities to insure proper analysis
of new programs and future direction. See Gregory & Klegon, The Value of Strategic
Marketing to the Hospital, HEALTHCARE FiN. MGMTr., Dec. 1983, at 16-20.
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profit margin.' 0 Institutions failing to implement these changes
likely will be purchased or cease to operate."
In the field of antitrust law, the traditional view of hospitals
as non-competitive entities no longer exists. 2 At one time, the
structure of the industry discouraged competition because the
demand for health care was independent of the price of services
or the activities of normal consumers. 3 Therefore, neither courts
nor commentators applied traditional theories of antitrust com-
10 Currently the hospital industry is in a situation similar to that of the defense
industry in the mid-1960's and the cable televsion industry in the mid-1970's. To meet
the challenge, hospitals are diversifying and broadening their revenue base. As a result,
Health Maintenance Organizations and Preferred Provider Organizations are being
developed. See Coddington & Pottle, Hospital Diversification Strategies: Lessons from
Other Industries, HEALmTHCAR FIN. Mamr., Dec. 1984, at 19-24.
1 See NHLA Seminar Probes Antitrust Exposure of Practices Within Health Care
Sector, 48 ANTrrRusr & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1200, at 239 (Jan. 31, 1985).
Three hundred hospitals closed their doors from 1976 to 1983. Another five hundred
are expected to close during the next ten years. Id. at 243.
,2 Prior to 1976 there was a general indifference to hospital merger activities.
Although much of this activity arguably affected interstate commerce, antitrust laws
were not applied. In 1976, the Supreme Court held that the relocation and expansion of
a local hospital had the requisite substantial effect on interstate commerce to bring the
defendants' acts opposing expansion under the Sherman Act. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 744 (1976). Epstein, New Antitrust Reality, Hose.,
Oct. 16, 1983, at 60, states:
[W]e are witnessing the steady transition of a field that was so largely
characterized by such unusual incentives that, until relatively recently ....
some courts were motivated to urge special antitrust treatment for that
field. It is increasingly difficult, and probably inappropriate, to urge special
treatment any longer in the face of the emerging economic relationships
and characteristics of the modern hospital system.
See also D. STARKWEATHER, supra note 1, at 489-91.
11 Hospital care was not economically competitive because the demand for
health care was not dependent upon the price of services. In a theory explain-
ing the demand for medical care, Joseph P. Newhouse hypothesized that
insurance coverage acts like a subsidy to the cost of medical care and
lowers the per unit cost. Consequently, the demand is elastic (dependent
upon price) and as a result of insurance, healthcare demand is increased.
However, demand changes in response to insurance coverage and not
necessarily the cost of healthcare. In addition, Newhouse hypothesized that
the demand for healthcare is indifferent unless the consumer becomes ill.
When the health status changes, it affects the individual's expenditures on
health. This causes the demand for healthcare to become inelastic (not
dependent upon price).
Note, supra note 4, at 303 n.23 (citing J. NEWHOUSE, THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE
4-15 (1978)).
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petition. 14 Recently, however, recognition of the industry's bur-
geoning competitiveness 15 has brought the hospital industry under
tighter scrutiny of the antitrust laws.
Even though this increased competition among hospitals has
increased the potential for antitrust litigation, 6 the relevant mar-
ket, 7 an essential element of antitrust analysis, has been defined
by the courts in a haphazard manner.' As a result, few unifying
principles can be derived from the case law. A precise definition
of the relevant market is important to the hospital industry
because of the potential increase in hospital merger litigation. 9
Primarily, four antitrust provisions are applicable to mergers
in the health care industry: (1) section 1 of the Sherman Act,
20
which prohibits concerted activity that actually restrains trade;
2'
4 See Epstein, supra note 12, at 61-62.
1 In the hospital industry non-price competition existed because provider's and
consumer's economic incentives were different from other industries. The consumer
rarely made choices of where to receive service and generally was unaware of the cost
of service because of third party insurance. The comparison of this industry to others
that are more traditional further demonstrates the unique qualities of the hospital
industry. Note, supra note 4, at 303 n.23 (citing J. NEWHOUSE, Tim EcoNoMcs OF
MEDICAL CARE 4-15 (1978)).
6 "By rough count, five times as many health antitrust actions have been brought
since the epic Goldfarb decision in 1975, than during the previous 85 years of Sherman
Act history." Halper, The Health Care Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Collision
Course?, 49 ANTITRusT L.J. 17, 17 (1980). "Today, hospitals renovate facilities to
increase their profitability, while in the past they primarily renovated to be functionally
efficient. . . . The objective of renovation [is] to capture larger markets.... ." Rothman,
Renovation: A Tool for Hospital Commercialization, Hosp., Feb. 16, 1985, at 95.
'1 The relevant market is the area of effective competition where the interchange-
ability of a product in a particular area of the country is examined to determine whether
a merger of firms that produce the product contravene the antitrust laws. See United
States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393-94 (1955). The relevant
market "is the narrowest market which is wide enough so that products from adjacent
areas or from other producers in the same area cannot compete on substantial parity
with those included in the market." L. SULLIVAN, AN'tIusT § 12, at 41 (1976).
11 The lack of consistency in defining the relevant market has led to criticism by
economists who have proffered more rigorous methods for defining the relevant market.
T. BRUNNER, T. KRATTENMAKER, R. SKIrOL, A. WEBSTER, MERGERS IN THE NEW AN-
TITRUST ERA 84-88 (1985) [hereinafter cited as BRUNNER].
'9 The FTC has recently litigated another hospital merger case. In re Hosp. Corp.
of Am., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,301 (Oct. 8, 1985).
-' 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
21 Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract
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(2) section 2 of the Sherman Act, 22 which prohibits unlawful
monopoly;23 (3) section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act,24 which prohibits unfair trade practices; 2- and (4) section 7
of the Clayton Act, 26 which is intended to arrest anticompetitive
tendencies in their incipiency. 27 Section 7 specifically prohibits
mergers and acquisitions of stock or assets in any line of com-
merce or in any section of the country where the effect of such
an acquisition may substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly.28 Thus, section 7 uses both product and
geographic characteristics in determining whether an antitrust
violation exists. 29
This Comment first examines general principles for defining
the relevant market. Second, it examines the approach taken by
or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if
any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
Id.
, Id. at § 2 (1982).
23 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other
person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
-' "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." Id.
" 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
2' No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other
share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce,
where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Id.
, Id.
" United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 620-22 (1974); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325-26 (1962); United States v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-95 (1957).
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two recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cases that ad-
dressed the issue of relevant markets. Finally, this Comment
concludes that the United States Justice Department Merger
Guidelines and the principles enunciated in bank merger cases
sufficiently address the problem of defining the relevant market
in hospital merger situations and therefore should be used as a
basis for further court decisions.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR DEFINING THE RELEVANT MARKET
The determination of the relevant market is crucial to the
outcome of an antitrust case because it is the first step in analyzing
potential violations.3 0 The relevant market is composed of both
product and geographic elements 3' and is the area of effective
competition where antitrust violations potentially occur.3 2 Con-
sequently, finding an antitrust violation depends upon the court's
interpretation of the effective area of competition. 33 This inter-
pretation serves as the basis for analyzing the violator's ability
to exert influence in the defined area. 34 Defining the relevant
market in antitrust litigation is a continuing problem and courts
have struggled to establish a methodology for producing con-
sistent results. 35
"' See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (2d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as ABA]. By defining the relevant product market too broadly or too
narrowly, the real effect on competition cannot be evaluated properly. A broad product
market "tends to minimize the competition between firms that already compete...."
Conversely, a narrow product market "can result in high market shares" for those
competing in the same market. Id. at 150. Similarly, the relevant geographic market that
is too broadly or narrowly defined will not accurately reflect the area of competition be-
tween the firms. Id. at 154.
1' A relevant market is composed of products that the merging firms supply for a
geographic area. A merger's impact on competition can be measured only in geographic
relevant product and geographic markets. To determine if a merger contravenes the
antitrust laws, the court must define the relevant market. By defining the relevant
market, a merger's impact on competition can be evaluated. See BRUNNER, supra note
18, at 89-163.
32 United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-35 (1973).
" See, e.g., 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
' The ability of the merging firms to exact a price for goods above what a
competitive market would tolerate might indicate that the firm has excessive market
power within a monopolized market. See Grand Union Co., 102 F.T.C. 812, 1040
(1983).
11 See BRUNNER, supra note 18, at 87. Market definition techniques included
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A. Defining the Relevant Product Market
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,3 6 the United States
Supreme Court found it necessary to determine the relevant
product market before deciding if a violation of section 7 of the
Clayton Act had occurred.37 The Court stated: "[T]he relevant
market must be drawn with sufficient breadth to include the
competing products of each of the merging companies and to
recognize competition where, in fact, competition exists. ' 38
Brown Shoe also introduced the submarket concept to anti-
trust litigation.3 9 Submarkets are divisions of a product market
used to determine whether a single product has sufficiently pe-
culiar characteristics to constitute a relevant market in itself.4
The Court listed seven practical indicia of a submarket: "indus-
try or public recognition of the submarket as a separate eco-
nomic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses,
unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices,
sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors. ' 4' The use
of submarkets allows inspection of one segment of a product
market to determine if there is a reasonable probability of less-
ened competition.4 2 If so, any merger affecting that product
market is proscribed. 43 Initially, this concept was controversial,
but it has become a practical and useful tool for relevant market
"cross-elasticity as a basic test, broad product markets that encompass smaller submar-
kets, product and service 'clusters' and subjectively drawn geographic markets." Id. The
Supreme Court's methodology became more consistent by the mid 1960's. Conse-
quently, ad hoc techniques gave way to a more predictable analysis. Two bank merger
cases decided in 1974 effectively disavowed the methods of the prior decade, "[y]et the
imprecision and subjectivity of the [market definition in] lower courts did not abate."
Id.
" 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
" Id. at 324.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 325.
See, e.g., id. at 326-28.
"' Id. at 325. The Court later indicated that all of the criteria set forth in Brown
Shoe need not be present to find a submarket. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
377 U.S. 271, 276 (1964).
41 "[I]t is necessary to examine the effects of a merger in each such economically
significant submarket to determine if there is a reasonable probability that the merger
will substantially lessen competition." 370 U.S. at 325.
"4 Id. The proscription expressed in § 7 of the Clayton Act applies to actual and
potential competition in corporate mergers when there is a tendency toward monopoly
1986-871
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analysis. 4 Submarkets have been broadly applied to numerous
industries 4 and were relied upon recently in hospital merger
litigation."
B. Defining the Relevant Geographic Market
The United States Supreme Court decision in United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co.47 was an important development in defin-
ing the relevant geographic market. The Court declared that a
geographic market need not be defined "by metes and bounds
as a surveyor would lay off a plot of ground. '4 Consequently,
a case will not be dismissed due to the lack of precision in the
definition of the relevant market. 49 Pabst illustrates that section
7 of the Clayton Act "require[s] merely that the [plaintiff] prove
the merger has substantial anticompetitive effect somewhere in
the United States." 50 This broad statement, however, left un-
resolved questions about the commercial realities of defining the
geographic market in a specific "section of the country. ' 5, The
Supreme Court later clarified this ambiguity by defining it as
the "area in which the acquired firm is an actual, direct com-
petitor."
5 2
or a reasonable likelihood of substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market.
See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 622-25 (1974).
"' The Court found that within a broad market, distinct well-defined submarkets
could exist. Each submarket could constitute a product market for antitrust purposes.
370 U.S. at 325.
41 See 377 U.S. at 275 (products used for electronic conductors); Tenneco, Inc. v.
FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1982) (shock absorber manufacturers); Yamaha Motor
Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982)
(outboard motor industry); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp.
729, 737-38 (D. Md. 1976) (chain saw manufacturers).
4 See In re Am. Medical Int'l., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) q 22,170, at 23,038-
39 (July 2, 1984). (Several of the Brown Shoe criteria were used in defining the relevant
product market.)
4 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
11 Id. at 549 (citing Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611
(1953)).
49 Id.
50 Id.
" Id. "Section of the country" is the specific language used in § 7 of the Clayton
Act. See note 27 supra.
12 418 U.S. at 622.
[Vol. 75
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C. Bank Merger Cases
Several United States Supreme Court bank merger cases
provide guidance in determining the relevant market in hospital
merger litigation. The bank cases provide useful analogies be-
cause of the unique and highly regulatory nature of both the
banking and hospital industries." There are facilities within each
industry that create competition by providing comparable serv-
ices. Within the banking industry, major competitors are banks
and savings and loans.14 Generally, savings and loans provide
products55 and money management services56 similar to commer-
cial banks. Hospitals also have numerous competitors, such as
physician's offices,57 outpatient surgical centers, 8 and free-stand-
ing emergency centers.5 9 These outpatient facilities perform many
medical services that are provided by most hospitals. Conse-
quently, although these competitors are not hospitals, they have
been considered as important factors in defining the relevant
product market in hospital merger litigation.
The most frequently cited bank merger case in hospital merger
litigation, United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,60 de-
" Each has competitors competing for customers with similar products. In this
sense, banks compete with savings and loans, credit unions, and other financial insti-
tutions while hospitals compete with numerous non-hospital facilities. Because banks
and hospitals offer unique services, however, their competitors are not considered within
the same product market in antitrust litigation. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,170 (July 2, 1984).
" 374 U.S. at 374 n.4 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" The Court defined credit to be the unique cluster of products provided by
commercial banks. This included personal and business loans, mortgage loans, tuition
financing, bank credit cards, and revolving credit funds. 374 U.S. at 326 n.5, 356.
- The Court found that commercial banks provided several services that were
insulated from competitors, including demand deposits from individuals and corporations,
estate and trust planning, safety deposit boxes, and investment advice. Id. at 356.
11 Non-hospital based physicians typically maintain private offices where numerous
patients are seen. The typical office visit is for routine treatment.
" Outpatient surgical centers perform minor surgery that traditionally has been
provided on an inpatient basis at hospitals.
1 Most emergicenters provide episodic primary care for fractures, skin lacerations,
and ear, nose and throat complaints. Just five years ago emergicenters were almost non-
existent. Today approximately 2,500 exist. C. Stromberg, Emergicenters, HEALT SPAN,
June 1985, at 2.
374 U.S. 321.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
parted from the Brown Shoe submarket concept and introduced
the "clusters of service ' 6 ' concept. A service cluster is an eco
nomic entity whose characteristics are so unique that it operates
free from effective competition. 62 The cluster composes a distinct
line of commerce that is insulated from a broad range of sub-
stitute services provided by competing institutions. 63
In Philadelphia National Bank, one of the distinct services
considered was personal loans. 64 While both commercial banks
and savings and loan associations provided this service, the small
savings and loan rates were invariably higher than that of com-
mercial banks, 65 placing them at a significant competitive dis-
advantage with respect to this service. Commercial banks were
determined to be a unique entity, free from effective competition,
and therefore they alone composed the relevant product mar-
ket.6 The Court held that the banks' loan services were "so
distinctive that they [were] entirely free of effective competition
from products or services of other financial institutions." 67 Thus,
the proposed merger of the commercial banks was enjoined.68
Philadelphia National Bank also influenced judicial deter-
mination of the relevant geographic market. The geographic
market was defined as a "workable compromise ... which
avoids the indefensible extremes. " 69 The Court recognized that
a certain amount of "artificiality" and "fuzziness" is present
6, Id. at 356.
62 Id. at 356-57.
63 Id. In the business of commercial banking, for instance, checking accounts,
trust administration, personal loans and twenty four-hour banking are specific services
provided at many banks. These services are also provided at savings and loans. When
viewed individually, these services may be unique and constitute a specific line of
commerce that is free from effective competition. In addition, when viewed collectively,
the uniqueness of the group of services (service cluster) is such that the entity providing
the services is free from effective competition. Therefore, checking accounts, trust
administration, personal loans and twenty four-hour banking are services that constitute
a unique cluster. The commercial banks that provide these services are unique economic
entities that function free from competition in a distinct line of commerce known as
commercial banking.
" Id. at 356.
63 Id.
Id. at 357.
67 Id. at 356.
61 Id. at 372.
Id. at 361.
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even in the most exacting attempts to define the geographic
dimensions of the relevant market.
Another bank merger case relied upon in the health care
context, United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co. of
Lexington,71 stated that "where merging companies are major
competitive factors in a relevant market, the elimination of
significant competition between them, by merger . . ., itself con-
stitutes a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act."' 72 The First
National Bank Court defined the relevant geographic market as
the county in which the banks were located because most cus-
tomers confined their banking transactions to that county.7 3 That
geographic boundary reflected the economic realities of the
banking industry by recognizing convenience and accessability
as factors that affect competition.
74
In United States v. Marine Bancorporation7 and United
States v. Connecticut National Bank,7 6 the Supreme Court fur-
ther laid a foundation for determining the relevant product and
geographic markets. In Marine, the relevant product market was
the business of commercial banking77 and the relevant geographic
market was the area where the acquired firm was a direct com-
petitor. 78 The case clarifies the definition of the relevant geo-
graphic market by indicating that for section 7 purposes the
"section of the country" and the "relevant geographic market"
are the same.7 9 In Connecticut National Bank, the unique cluster
of services provided by commercial banks was the basis for
product market determination.80 The geographic market was the
local area where the merging firms were in direct competition. 8'
The lower courts have been slow to adopt the United States
Id. at 360 n.37.
" 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
' Id. at 671-72.
" Id. at 668 (Over 9507o of the bank's business originated in the local county.).
Id.
418 U.S. 602 (1974).
418 U.S. 656 (1974).
418 U.S. 602 at 618-19.
7, Id. at 622.
Id. at 619-23.
418 U.S. 656 at 666.
" Id. at 667.
1986-87]
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Supreme Court's guidance in defining the relevant market.82
This is especially evident in health care litigation because hos-
pital mergers involving very similar facts have yielded differ-
ent results. For example, in American Medicorp Inc. v. Humana,
Inc. ,83 the relevant product market was found to include only
short-term acute care community hospitals, 84 while in In re Hos-
pital Corporation of America,8 5 the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) found that a relevant product market included all general
acute care services.16 Although both cases involved general acute
care facilities, the relevant markets were defined very differ-
ently.8 7
D. The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
The U.S. Department of Justice has set forth merger guide-
lines to assist the courts in establishing unifying principles.88 The
Justice Department Merger Guidelines (Guidelines) use the mar-
ket power concept to define the relevant market or markets.8 9
That principle requires, "identifying firms that, were they to act
as a single entity, could profitably raise and maintain price[s]". °
All relevant evidence is examined to determine the potential for
monopolization of the market. 9' In particular, price move-
ments,9" product configuration, 9 and buyer's 94 and seller's per-
'2 See note 35 supra.
" 445 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Id. at 605.
3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,301 (Oct. 8, 1985).
Id. at 22,301.
See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text. Although these cases classified
the relevant product market in different terms, there does not appear to be a rational
basis for defining the market differently.
" See generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES, reprinted in 2 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 4500, (No. 655 Part II) (June 18, 1984) [hereinafter MERGER
GUIDELINES].
" Market power is the ability of one or more firms to profitably maintain prices
above competitive levels for a significant period of time. Id. at 30-31.
w BRUNNER, supra note 18, at 88.
91 See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 88, at 36-37.
92 Id. at 36.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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ceptions of the market95 are emphasized. The Guidelines examine
the effect of a small, hypothetical, nontransitory price increase
above prevailing or future price levels to determine the relevant
product market. 96 This departs from the "reasonable interchange-
ability of use" standard the courts employed in determining the
relevant market. 97 The Guidelines also use the hypothetical price
increase to define the relevant geographic market98 by determin-
ing how many consumers would be lost to other competitors.
The Guidelines deviate from the case law standards by quan-
titatively and qualitatively giving form to supply and demand
dynamics that drive real markets. 99 Market power is the under-
lying quantitative measure that determines the market share of
each firm.100 In effect, the Guidelines seek to define relevant markets
more precisely through quantitative measures. 101 The American Bar
Association also assists the courts by providing general concepts
to determine relevant markets.0 2 The general concepts are gleaned
from an examination of past and present methodologies used in
defining the relevant market.0 3
' Id.
Id. at 37. [rMhe Department will begin with each product (narrowly defined)
produced or sold by each merging firm and ask what would happen if a
hypothetical monopolist of that product imposd a "small but significant and
nontransitory" increase in price. If the price increase would cause so many
buyers to shift to other products that a hypothetical monopolist would not
find it profitable to impose such an increase in price, then the Department
will add to the product group the product that is the next-best substitute for
the merging firm's product and ask the same question again. This process
will continue until a group of products is identified for which a hypothetical
monopolist could profitably impose a "small but significant and nontrans-
itory" increase in price. The Department generally will consider the relevant
product market to be the smallest group of products that satisfies this test.
' See 377 U.S. at 276 (copper wire compared with aluminum wire); 374 U.S. at
356-57 (commercial banks compared with savings and loans); 445 F. Supp. at 599
(development of hospitals compared with proprietary ownership).
' See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 88, at 32-34.
" See BRUNNER, supra note 18, at 103.
' See note 120 infra and accompanying text.
Id.
'2 See ABA, supra note 30, at 147.
'"Id.
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II. DEFINING THE RELEVANT MARKET IN HOSPITAL MERGERS
A. The Relevant Product Market
American Medical Internationa0 4 (AMI) and Hospital Cor-
poration of America'05 (HCA) are the leading hospital merger
cases. AMI was the first hospital merger case brought before
the full Federal Trade Commission board (FTC).0 The FTC's
complaint charged that AMI attempted to monopolize the San
Luis Obispo hospital market by purchasing a 138-bed community
hospital in the city. 0 7 The purchase, combined with a 172-bed
facility previously owned by AMI, gave AMI sixty percent of
the hospitals operating in the city. 0 More importantly, the
acquisition gave AMI approximately eighty percent of the acute
care hospital beds in the city.' °9
In determining the relevant product market with sufficient
"breadth" to recognize relevant competition," 0 there is signifi-
cant potential for manipulation of factors."' Using quantitative
and qualitative means set forth in the Merger Guidelines, the
Federal Trade Commission seeks to increase the consistency with
which the relevant product market is defined." 2 The Guidelines
employ a product's interchangeability of use and its sensitivity to
cross-elasticity to determine the outer boundaries of the product
in a specific market." 3 In this context, an element of cross-
,04 In re Am. Medical Int'l., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,170 (July 2, 1984).
105 In re Hosp. Corp. of Am., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,301 (Oct. 8, 1985).
Wallace, AMI is Guilty in Antitrust Case: FTC, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 1980,
28.
"AMI acquired French Hospital in 1979, giving the company control of three
of the five hospitals in the San Luis Obispo County. A 1981 FTC complaint alleged
AMI had attempted to monopolize the hospital market in both the city and county of
San Luis Obispo.... ." 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 23,029.
I /d.
Id. at 23,056.
"° See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962). In defining the
relevant product market, overinclusion or underinclusion of products can lead to differ-
ent antitrust findings. Therefore, precisely defining what is included is the major point
of contention for each party. Id.
112 See text accompanying notes 88-101 supra.
M Id. at 325. Cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1960).
(The demand for steel plates and shapes must be measured against all other comparable
rolled products because rolled steel producers can make other products interchangeable
with shapes and plates.).
[Vol. 75
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elasticity is the responsiveness of the sales of one product in
relation to the price changes of another product." 4 Therefore,
"[iff a slight decrease in price .. . causes a considerable number
of customers . . . to switch ... then the products compete in
the same market.""' 1
5
In AMI the definition of the relevant product market was
critical to the outcome of the case. ' 6 The FTC sought to deter-
mine if there was a high cross-elasticity of demand for medical
services provided at hospitals and other facilities such as out-
patient clinics and free-standing emergency centers. ' 7 If so, this
would indicate the existence of a common product market. The
issue was whether related services placed significant constraints
on the ability of the merging firms to raise their prices, or lower
the supply or quality of their service."" General acute care hos-
pital services were found to be the relevant product market and
therefore the appropriate service upon which to evaluate the
effects of the acquisition."19 The FTC relied on market power to
determine AMI's market share.' 20
"' See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956).
Id. at 400.
If general acute care services constitute the product market in most hospital
merger situations, it will be increasingly difficult for most acquisitions to take place
where one or more institutions are owned by the same entity. 3 TRADE REG. REp. at
23,040. See notes 1-10 supra and accompanying text. The courts primarily use § 7 of
the Clayton Act when examining antitrust violations in merger settings. See ABA, supra
note 30, at 150.
" If the cross-elasticity is high, then products belong in the same market. See 3
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,170, at 23,039 n.8. "The purpose of product market
analysis is to ascertain what grouping of products or services should be included in a
single relevant market." Id. at 23,039 (quoting statement of Federal Trade Commission
concerning horizontal mergers, reprinted in CCH TRADE REGULATION REPOrTS, No. 546
at 84 (June 16, 1982)).
"1 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,170. After losing the argument of antitrust
exemption for the hospital industry, AMI's second defense was the product market
limitation. Id. If AMI was successful in establishing a broad product market, then
the market concentration would have been significantly lower. Therefore, by seeking
to have non-hospital providers included in the product market, lessened competition was
less likely to be found.
9 Id. at 23,040.
'2 AMI contested the use of market power to determine the effects of the acqui-
sition. At issue was the traditional presumption that a substantial increase in market
concentration or in a firm's market share results in a lessening of competition.
AMI argued that the health care industry does not respond in the traditional
economic manner. AMI contended that implicit in the market share presumption
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 75
The AMI finding suggests that primary level acute care fa-
cilities have services that are differentiated from other non-
hospital providers.' 2' Primary level facilities, which are often
community hospitals, provide the least technical care of the three
types of acute care facilities. 22 Certain care provided at these
institutions is also provided by surgical centers 123 and outpatient
clinics. 124 AMI, seeking to have numerous outpatient substitutes
included in the product market, disputed the exclusion of these
non-hospital facilities.'
25
Similarly, in Philadelphia National Bank,'26 the defendant
sought to have non-commercial bank substitutes-savings and
loans-included in the service market. 27 As in Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank, the FTC in AMI found that the services provided
by the hospital had sufficient peculiar characteristics to negate
reasonable interchangeability, and thus constituted a unique
"cluster" of services. 28 The FTC recited the factors essential to
the "cluster" market definition as
is the notion that market power is based on the existence of a competitive price and
the price sensitivity of buyers and sellers. Moreover, AMI argued that increased market
share does not necessarily enhance market power in the health care industry where price
sensitivity is absent. AMI claimed that the third party payment system limited the ability
of a sole provider to exact charges in excess of what it could get in a more competitive
market.
The FTC, however, upheld the use of market power and pointed to its use in other
industries including a previous application in the health care industry. Furthermore, the
FTC concluded that price constraints influence the decisions made by both buyers and
sellers in the health care industry and give rise to price and non-price competition. Id.
at 23,042-43.
2I The non-hospital providers that are interchangeable include clinics, physicians'
offices, and medical laboratories. See 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 22,170, at 23,039.
' Hospitals are categorized according to the level of care provided at the institu-
tion. The categories include primary, secondary and tertiary. The most technologically
advanced care is provided at the tertiary facility and basic inpatient care is provided at
the primary level institution. Tertiary facilities are generally university-teaching facilities
that provide care on a regional level. Primary level facilities are typically small com-
munity-oriented institutions. See generally J. GOLDSMITH, HosprrAis, supra note 2.
123 Id.
124 Id.
-'2 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,170 at 23,039 (July 2, 1984).
'1 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
,"I There were identical substitutes for almost every service provided by commercial
banks. Id. at 356-57.
,2 Although each individual service that comprises the cluster of general acute
care hospital services may well have outpatient substitutes, the benefit that
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"the functional complementarity and integration linking the
products," the "degree of commonality in the technology and
manufacturing processes involving the components of the mar-
ket," whether "all products are marketed through similar
channels and to the same group of buyers" and whether "this
market has recognition in the industry," . . . "whether there
are competitive relationships between the lines of commerce
warranting them to be aggregated as a group for the purpose
of measuring the impact of the merger on competition," ...
or "where for technological or other reasons, there is com-
monality in production and distribution resulting in a distinct
and recognized 'industry' of firms who sell a broad line of
such products ... ."129
Additionally, the FTC recognized that government agen-
cies, 130 state law 3' and industry3 2 treat general acute care hos-
pitals as a distinct class of health care providers. The FTC also
noted that free-standing surgical or emergency treatment facili-
ties were absent from the area, 33 and that entry barriers effec-
tively barred new suppliers of general acute care services. 34 The
FTC further recognized that AMI could provide these services
on an outpatient basis. 35 The complementarity of the individual
services constituted the unique cluster 36 and the comprehensive
accrues to patient and physician is derived from their complementarity.
There is no readily available substitute supplier of the benefit that this
complementarity confers on patient and physician.
3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,170 at 23,040 (July 2, 1984).
'- Id. at 23,039-40 (citations omitted) (quoting British Oxygen Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241,
1345 (1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d
Cir. 1977) (industrial gases)).
These are state health planning agencies. Id.
" Every state has provisions for hospital licensure. This is often done by category
according to whether the care provided is acute or long term. Id.
"2 Id.
"I Even if these non-hospital providers were present, it is unlikely that the court
would have reached a different result. Id.
"4 The barriers to entry of new competition is an important element in finding a
violation of the antitrust provisions. Because of this factor the cross-elasticity of supply
for hospital services is low. Federal and state planning laws effectively prevent the
building of new hospitals without demonstrating need. Consequently, entry by a com-
petitor would be difficult and monopoly power could be exerted in certain situations.
Id. at 23,041.
Id. at 23,040.
Id.
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integrated care within the hospitals distinguished these entities
from non-hospital services.'3 7 In short, there were no readily
available substitute suppliers of services.' 38
In Hospital Corporation of America, 39 monopolization of
the acute care hospital services in the Chattanooga, Tennessee
urban area was alleged' 40 after HCA acquired the management
agreements and hospitals of two competing companies.' 4' At the
time HCA acquired the acute care facilities in Chattanooga, they
owned one of eleven licensed facilities in the area. 42 After the
acquisition HCA became owner or manager of five of the eleven
hospitals. 43 Prior to the acquisitions, HCA controlled approxi-
mately fourteen percent of the licensed acute care beds'44 and
had approximately fourteen percent of the total inpatient hos-
pital days during the previous year. 45 After the acquisitions,
HCA controlled approximately twenty-seven percent of the li-
censed beds'6 and had twenty-six percent of the patient days.' 47
The FTC argued that the definition of the product market
should include only those facilities that provided acute inpatient
hospital services and emergency hospital services to the critically
ill. 48 This definition excluded non-hospital outpatient services 49
17 Id.
13- Id.
"1 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 22,301.
, Id. at 23,325.
"I HCA acquired Hospital Affiliates International (HAl) in a stock transaction
valued at $650 million in August 1981. HAl owned or leased 57 hospitals and managed
78 hospitals nationwide. Of the 78 management agreements, 5 were in the Chattanooga,
Tennessee area. Approximately four months later, HCA acquired another hospital cor-
poration, Health Care Corporation (HCC), in a stock transaction valued at $30 million.
At the time of the acquisition HCC owned one hospital in the Chattanooga area. Id. at
23,328.
'4 Id.
4-, There are eleven general acute care hospitals in Hamilton County, Tennessee
and the Georgia suburbs of Chattanooga. This area is defined as the Chattanooga urban
area. Id. at 23,331.
I" Id. at 23,346.
145 Id.
'1 Id.
147 Id.
"I Id. at 23,332.
"49 This included free standing emergency centers as well as non-hospital providers
of inpatient services such as nursing homes. Id. at 23,332-33.
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except for care provided to critically ill patients in the emergency
room.5 0 HCA argued for the inclusion of outpatient and inpa-
tient care facilities in the relevant product market.' 5' HCA's
argument was similar to the one expressed by AMI. 52 HCA
pointed to the proliferation of numerous outpatient providers
competing with hospitals for ambulatory care patients. 5 a Ulti-
mately the relevant market included outpatient services that hos-
pitals provide, but excluded outpatient services that non-hospitals
provide.Y
4
Here, as in AMI, the unique cluster of services that hospitals
provide was the basis for excluding non-hospitals.' 55 Hospitals
were included in the same market because "acute care hospitals
compete with each other in offering both kinds of care and...
outpatient facilities feed patients to the inpatient facilities."' 15 6
Even though neither side appealed the administrative law judge's
ruling, the FTC noted that the judge's relevant product market
definition did not provide a happy medium between the two
competing positions. 57 Instead, the FTC suggested that the com-
petitive realities of the market are accurately reflected by defin-
ing the market as inpatient hospital services alone.'"
-, Id. at 23,333.
" Id.
3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,170, at 23,039.
" HCA's expert witness testified that outpatient care is growing rapidly for hos-
pitals, as well as for free-standing facilities such as emergency care and one-day surgery
centers. This is due in part to the changes in medical technology. There are a growing
number of procedures that can be done on an outpatient basis. 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 22,301 at 23,333.
" Id. at 23,329. The FTC did not decide the issue in its opinion because neither
side appealed the ruling of the administrative law judge concerning the relevant product
market. Id.
"I The administrative law judge held that the market should include outpatient
services provided by hospitals but excluded outpatient services provided by non-hospitals.
The unique combination of services that only hospitals can provide proved to be the
controlling factor in this decision. Id. at 23,333.
" Id.
"'Id.
' The FTC noted that the evidence tended to show both that free-standing out-
patient facilities compete with hospitals for many outpatients and that hospitals offer,
and inpatients consume, a cluster of services that bears little relation to outpatient care.
Consequently, it was suggested that defining the cluster of hospital inpatient services as
a separate market better reflects the competitive realities of this case. Id.
1986-87]
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Defining the relevant product market as inpatient hospital
services focuses on the basic element of the hospital industry:
the acute care bed. 59 This element allows accurate compilation
of information regarding hospital revenue,' ° operations, 6' and
utilization of service. 62 Therefore, FTC recognition of inpatient
hospital services as the relevant product market, and inpatient
hospital beds as the major element of inpatient hospital services,
is appropriate for the health care industry.
B. The Relevant Geographic Market
Determination of the relevant geographic market-like de-
termination of the relevant product market-is necessary to find
a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 63 "The geographic
market must both 'correspond to the commercial realities' of
the industry and be economically significant."'64 Furthermore,
the relevant geographic market or "section of the country' 1
65
refers to the geographic area where the acquiring and acquired
companies effectively compete in the marketing of the relevant
product. '6
Both the product and geographic markets were considered in
AMI. 67 The analysis of the geographic market focused in part
on the Justice Department Merger Guidelines,'" which utilize
hypothetical price changes within different geographic areas to
'9 Hospital beds are usually defined according to the type of case and client served,
which is generally adult acute care licensed beds. See generally RAPa, supra note 1, at
234-37.
- Revenue is often calculated by hospital service, which is further broken down
by designated beds per service. Id.
"I A myriad of operational information is maintained by most hospitals. The focus
of much of the information is on the hospital bed. Id.
6 This is generally defined by the particular specialty for which the bed is desig-
nated. Id.
16, United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 618 (1974). See also
United States v. DuPont & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957). See generally RSR Corp. v.
FTC, 602 F.2d 1317, 1322-24 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
1" 370 U.S. at 336-37 (quoting American Crystal Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar
Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958)).
1 418 U.S. at 620.
1 Id. at 622.
617 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 22,170 at 23,038 (July 2, 1984).
1 W Id. at 23,041.
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define the relevant geographic market. 69 Consequently, the court
defined the relevant geographic market as the city and county
of San Luis Obispo. 70 AMI disputed this finding, arguing that
the relevant market should have included a broader area.' 7' To
rebut this assertion the FTC relied on patient flow statistics of
hospital service utilization in the city and county.172 The relevant
considerations were where patients actually go for care and
where they practically may go for care. 173 The detailed conclu-
sions supporting the city and county market definitions consid-
ered geographic barriers and industry recognition, which are
commercial realities that affect competition in the hospital serv-
ices market. 74
The FTC cited several other factors important to their deci-
sion, including the technological disparity between the city and
county hospitals.'17 This factor is important because it relates to
the ability of one institution to compete effectively with other
institutions in a defined geographic area. 76 The FTC determined
that the hospitals in the city were more technologically advanced
than those in the county and therefore were not competitors.
77
Another factor considered was that most of the physicians in
the area had offices located in the city. 78 Because those physi-
cians with offices located in the city tended to admit the majority
I d.
For antitrust purposes, the Commission upheld the finding of two relevant
geographic markets. Id.
" AMI argued that many county residents travel outside county boundaries for
care and that city hospitals rely on out-of-city residents to occupy their beds. Id.
112 The patient flow statistics demonstrated the patient inflow to county hospitals
and the migration of patients to hospitals beyond those in the county. The evidence
indicated that 90 percent of the people in the five county hospitals were residents of
that county. The statistics further showed that few patients traveled outside the county
for care. Id.
171 Id.
" Id.
' The technology level is an important element in the health care industry. The
city hospitals offered cardiac catheterization and open-heart surgery and also were
equipped with advanced diagnostic equipment. The county hospitals could not compete
with the city hospitals because of the disparity in sophistication. Id. at 23,042.
,7 Id.
'"Id.
179 Many hospitals are building physician offices adjacent to the facility to promote
utilization of that hospital. Id.
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of their patients to the hospitals in the city, the argument for
the existence of two separate geographic markets was strength-
ened. 79 The final indication of separate geographic markets was
the view of local hospital patients that the city and county were
distinct geographic markets.8 0
In HCA' 81 the relevant geographic market was the Chatta-
nooga urban area. The complaint alleged that HCA's acquisition
threatened to substantially lessen competition in the inpatient
hospital service market. 8 2 In analyzing the market the FTC
Complaint Counsel argued that a static snapshot of the Chat-
tanooga urban area inadequately reflected the likelihood of fu-
ture anticompetitive behavior. 8 3 Instead they argued that current
market behavior should be viewed in a dynamic framework
considering the possible competitive responses of firms outside
the current market area to anticompetitive behavior of firms
within the market. 8 4 The Complaint Counsel sought an ex-
panded geographic market including the Chattanooga Metropol-
itan Statistical Area (MSA).8 5 Factors offered in support of this
position included the general trade and commuting patterns that
reflect potential competition among hospitals located in the MSA,
and the federal government's use of the MSA to determine
Medicare reimbursement under the new prospective payment
system. 8
6
17 Id.
'm Id.
181 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,301.
1-2 Id.
, Id. at 23,334.
'~Id.
Id. at 23,335. By adopting this definition, three additional hospitals would be
included in the relevant market. Two of the three hospitals were acquired by HCA in
the acquisition of HAI. Consequently, this would increase HCA's market share and
divestiture of these institutions would be sought. Id.
1S Id. at 23,335-36. The Complaint Counsel's argument for this definition took on
a different form because of the Medicare prospective payment system. Counsel argued
that full implementation of this program would further stimulate integration of the
MSA's into distinct hospital markets. Those hospitals outside of the MSA would be
disadvantaged in their capacity to compete with nearby MSA hospitals because the
reimbursement for those hospitals in the MSA would be significantly higher. Conse-
quently, the "rural" hospitals would be less able to expend funds to improve their
services. Moreover, at least with respect to those patients enrolled in the Medicare
[Vol. 75
1986-871 HOSPITAL MERGERS
HCA countered that the relevant market should be limited
to the Chattanooga urban area. 87 HCA's argument was primar-
ily based upon physicians' admitting practices and the role that
physicians played in determining where a patient received care. 8
The FTC found that the weight of the evidence supported HCA's
argument and the administrative law judge's findings. 8 9 In par-
ticular, it was noted that physicians almost invariably decided
where patients were admitted.190 Further, "[w]ith few exceptions,
every physician who admitted [patients] to Chattanooga urban
area hospitals admitted exclusively to other hospitals in the
Chattanooga urban area."' 9' This point was closely examined by
the administrative judge below, who applied the Elzinga-Hogarty
test, which measures the amount of commerce that enters and
leaves the market in question. 92 The FTC agreed that the Chat-
tanooga urban area was the relevant section of the country for
this case.
93
program, the MSA would become an area within which pricing patterns would be linked
and price movements would be similar. Id. at 23,336.
Id. at 23,334.
"- The expert witness for HCA testified that the relevant geographic market is
determined to a great extent by physician admitting practice. He suggested that physician
practice, rather than patient choice, determines to what hospital the patient will be
admitted. To further this point, HCA introduced a study that listed, by speciality, for
each hospital in the Chattanooga area, the physicians who admitted to each particular
hospital. The study showed the number of inpatient days for which each physician was
responsible. With few exceptions, every physician who admitted to Chattanooga urban
hospitals admitted to other hospitals exclusively in the Chattanooga urban area. Id.
' See id. "Complaint Counsel's argument does not convince us that the hospitals
to the northeast and southeast of Chattanooga would be less able to exert a restraining
influence on urban area hospitals than the hospitals to the west of the city." Id.
I d. at 23,334. The FTC found no reason why "doctors would be more willing
to obtain admitting privileges at outlying MSA hospitals than at the more modern and
better equipped" hospitals in the urban area. Id. at 23,336.
Id. at 23,334. See note 188 supra and accompanying text.
See id. at 23,334-35 n.7. The "E-H" test is based on LIFO ("little in from
outside") and LOFI ("little out from inside") statistics. As applied to hospital geographic
markets, the LOFI statistic demonstrates the percentage of patients of an area's hospitals
who reside in the area rather than outside the area. The LIFO statistic demonstrates the
percentage of hospital patients from a particular area who use hospitals in their area
rather than use hospitals in other areas. Id. "Evidence that few patients leave an area
[LIFO] and few patients enter an area to obtain hospital services [LOFI], strongly
supports the conclusion that the area constitutes a relevant geographic market, according
to the analysis." Id.
"I Id. at 23,337.
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Both HCA and AMI demonstrate that it is a difficult task
to define the relevant geographic market in health care litigation.
Nevertheless, the uniqueness of the industry should not preclude
accurate assessment of the market. 94 Patient flow data'95 and
other relevant data maintained by local planning agencies 96 and
regulatory authorities 97 are invaluable in determining the rele-
vant market. All of these avenues of information should be
used, because the relevant geographic market can vary tremen-
dously in size and requires an "all facts and circumstances" test
to be properly defined.
CONCLUSION
The decisions in American Medical International and Hos-
pital Corporation of America were built up on the foundation
laid in Brown Shoe and Philadelphia National Bank. The Phil-
adelphia National Bank cluster of service concept provided the
basis for distinguishing between inpatient and outpatient hospital
services and the submarket concept of Brown Shoe allowed even
further analysis. For example, the peculiar characteristics of the
services, industry and public recognition, sensitivity to changes
in price, and uniqueness of facilities were all important factors
the courts considered in arriving at their decisions.
American Medical International was the first major hospital
merger case to come before the full Federal Trade Commission.
By applying concepts from the bank industry, which has had
antitrust problems similar to the hospital industry, the task of
litigating a merger in the complex hospital industry was much
easier. In Hospital Corporation of America, the second major
hospital merger case to come before the full Federal Trade
Commission, the FTC used a similar approach.
There were differences, however, in the product market def-
inition in the two cases. In AMI, the product market was defined
as the cluster of general acute care hospital services. This ex-
The FTC's use of patient flow data has been influential. See note 171 supra.
"g See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 88. In this context, patient flow refers to
the ingress and egress of patients from one geographic area to another.
"' State health planning agencies and local hospital associations.
' This includes the state and federal government.
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cluded outpatient substitutes, because the benefit that accrues to
the patient and physician is derived from the complementarity
of those services. In HCA, the relevant product market was
defined as the cluster of services that acute care hospitals of-
fered, including both outpatient and inpatient care. This did not
prove to be outcome determinative in HCA, but in other hospital
merger cases it could be quite significant. The Commission rec-
ognized this point and in future cases probably will seek to have
one distinct product market for inpatient services and another
for outpatient services, to analyze the anticompetitive effects.
Hospital mergers force the courts to face a problem impor-
tant to the well-being of every individual receiving medical treat-
ment in the United States. With the rapidly changing health care
system, the need to establish clearly defined principles for hos-
pital acquisitions is paramount. The practical indicia Brown Shoe
recognized are sufficiently analogous to the health care industry
for them to be applied with ease when defining the relevant
markets.
In particular, the cluster of service concept is the most per-
suasive and important precedent in defining the relevant product
market in hospital merger cases. It allows specific services to be
categorized in sufficiently competitive markets, thereby demon-
strating the effects of competition in that category. The recog-
nition of the health care industry's unique geographic features
and entry barriers is also critical to analyze and define accurately
the relevant geographic market.
The Justice Department Merger Guidelines appear to be
effective in defining the relevant market. The Guidelines rely on
economic factors and consequently have had limited use in the
hospital merger context because of the industry's unique "non-
economic" history. With increased litigation in the health care
industry it is probable that the Merger Guidelines will be applied
more frequently. The 1984 revision of the Guidelines reflect a
move toward their expanded application in health care mergers.
The choice between the case law principles and the Merger
Guidelines will vary according to the type of case presented. If
the case is litigated there will likely be a reliance on case law
principles when defining the relevant market rather than the
untested principles of the Merger Guidelines. Although the use
of both theories is appropriate at the present, the variety and
1986-871
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complexity of future mergers will certainly require revisions and
alterations in the theories until a truly satisfactory standard that
offers uniformity and equity is produced.
Keith B. Hunter
